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Abstract 
 
We assess herding by considering the lead-lag relationship of sovereign ratings assigned by the 3 
main rating agencies at the individual country level. The only previous study of such a lead-lag 
relationship (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010) used pooled data methods that assume this lead-lag 
relationship is homogeneous across countries. Given that different rating agencies may have 
different levels of expertise (reputation) for different countries it is not obvious that such 
homogeneity holds. We therefore conduct poolability tests within this context to assess this 
assumption and find evidence of heterogeneity. This leads us to conduct country-by-country 
time-series tests to assess the lead-lag relationship among agencies. To our knowledge we are the 
first to do this and thereby extend the literature on herding among rating agencies' sovereign 
assignments. We also consider changes in the lead-lag relationship through time by splitting the 
sample into pre-crisis and crisis periods to assess the extent to which any herding is intentional 
and our results indicate some degree of heterogeneity through time. To the extent that there is 
herding we find that it is generally towards Standard and Poor’s ratings confirming our 
expectations given that this agency is regarded as possessing the greatest reputational capital. 
However, our results do not support the expectation that Fitch is a follower for more (a leader for 
less) countries than Moody’s. 
 
Keywords: sovereign ratings, herding, cross-country heterogeneity 
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1. Introduction 
 
The reputation of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) was tarnished during the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) in 2007/2008. Since the GFC it has become evident that CRAs systematically 
mispriced risk through inflated rating assignments. Empirical and theoretical studies have, for a 
long time, challenged the role of CRAs within financial markets. In particular, the policies of 
rating assignments conducted by the largest CRAs that include Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s 
(S&P’s hereafter) and Fitch Ratings have been questioned. None of these CRAs provided any 
warning signals about the problems before the GFC. This became evident when financial 
markets faced a full-blown crisis. At the outset of the GFC an unprecedented number of the rated 
entities and financial instruments issued by financial institutions, governments and corporates 
suffered from multi-notch downgrades. These massive downgrades show that ratings assigned by 
CRAs failed to reflect the true risk of the rated entities.
1
 As a result, the unique position of CRAs 
within the financial market has been even more scrutinised and criticised by governments and 
regulators.  
The signs of inflated ratings were observable even before the GFC, e.g., Enron and 
Worldcom. Liberman (2002), for example, argues that the largest CRAs over the last 30 years 
gained quasi-governmental power to determine which companies within the corporate world are 
creditworthy and which are not. White (2010) discusses how Moody’s and S&P’s received a 
special status as “nationally recognised statistical rating organization[s]” in 1975. That meant 
that CRAs gained power, for example, to affect an issuer’s cost of raising capital (banks use 
credit ratings for calculating their capital requirements).  
Recent papers on CRAs attempt to explain the causes of inflated ratings information bias 
through CRAs reputation, competition, ratings shopping, and conflict of interest between CRAs 
and financial institutions, see, for example, Skreta and Veldkamp (2009), Becker and Milbourn 
(2011), Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2011), Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2012), and Goel and Thakor 
(2015) among others.  
A frequent argument of these studies is that the market structure in which CRAs operate 
could contribute to the biased and inflated ratings.  The market structure may affect decision-
                                                          
1
 Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) report that 64% of all downgrades in 2007 and 2008 were linked to home equity 
loans or first mortgages as collateral. Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) backed by asset-backed securities 
(ABS) accounted for a large share of the downgrades and some of the most severe downgrades. 
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taking independence in ratings assignments of individual CRAs. Moody’s, S&P’s and Fitch 
Ratings undertake their business activities in an oligopolistic market and their activities account 
for more than 90% of the market (OECD, 2010).  Morgan (2002) argues that CRAs operate in a 
market environment that has prevailing oligopolistic characteristics along with an opaque 
process of ratings assignments. Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009), Opp, Opp and Harris 
(2013) and Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013) show that the members of a tight, protected oligopoly 
might become complacent and less concerned about the problems of protecting their long-run 
reputations. 
In this paper, we further develop and extend the discussion of how a market environment 
can affect sovereign rating assignments. We focus on sovereign ratings in 35 countries that were 
assigned by Moody’s, S&P’s and Fitch Ratings. All three CRAs state in their reports that their 
sovereign rating methodologies rely on the rigorous quantitative data analyses along with 
qualitative evaluation. Following Cantor and Packer (1996) we assume that key determinants of 
sovereign rating assignments are underpinned by standard macroeconomic variables.  That 
means that sovereign ratings should be quite similar across agencies. 
We examine whether there is herding behaviour among the three largest CRAs that 
operate in a peculiar oligopolistic market structure (as previous research indicates). In particular, 
we extend current empirical research on credit ratings quality by considering heterogeneous 
herding behaviour of CRAs’ assignments across countries. CRAs could provide the same ratings 
for a country independently because they base decisions on the same information.
 
However, 
while different agencies produce similar ratings they are not completely the same (as is evident 
by casual inspection of comparative ratings). Guttler and Wahrenburg (2007), Alsakka and ap 
Gwilym (2010) and Lugo, Croce and Faff (2014) explore potential behavioural pattern, the 
timing of rating revisions, and reputational factors that may affect rating assignments due to 
herding. In our study, we assess herding by considering the lead-lag relationship of sovereign 
ratings assigned by the three largest rating agencies at the individual country level. If we find the 
presence of herding for at least some countries this contributes to a discussion on inflated credit 
rating assignments. We do not argue that there is necessarily explicit collusive behaviour among 
CRAs in terms of assigned ratings. What we intend to do is to examine whether changes in rating 
assignments across CRAs reflect rating changes by a leading rating agency.  
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The intuition behind this argument is that smaller and newer CRAs, eg. Fitch Ratings, 
that do not have the same degree of reputation as established CRAs (S&P’s and Moody’s), may 
follow assigned ratings from the reputable CRAs. Alternatively, we can argue that those CRAs 
that do not have the same quality of analysts and experience follow the leader in this segment of 
ratings – the different level of expertise across CRAs is discussed by White (2010) and Bar-Isaac 
and Shapiro (2011).  If this is the case then inflated or incorrect ratings assessments will not be 
questioned since they are in line with reputable CRAs. Furthermore, CRAs may intentionally 
inflate or level rating assignments with their competitors to maintain (attract) potential customers 
due to ratings shopping (Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009; Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro, 2012). If we 
trace a pattern of herding among CRAs, we may also explain why there are marginal differences 
in the rated entities, that is, why CRAs inflate ratings in the same way.  
The concept of herding behaviour across CRAs may be explained in a similar way as 
price leadership theory of oligopoly pricing. Alternatively, we could see the parallel with 
institutional industry herding.  Sias (2004) and Choi and Sias (2009) provide an extensive 
analysis of herding behaviour among institutional investors. Sias (2004) shows that institutions 
herd as a result of inferring information from each other’s trades. The contemporary research and 
empirical evidence from CRAs support the direction of this type of research, see, for example, 
Lugo, Croce and Faff (2014) and Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2010). The notion underlying herding 
behaviour is that the action of one agent is influenced by that of other agents. Within the context 
of sovereign ratings, herding could be interpreted as one CRA’s sovereign ratings being 
influenced by another, even though the agencies should produce independent ratings.
2
 
Our paper contributes to related literature in several ways. First, the analysis of CRAs’ 
herding contributes to the work of recent studies by Lugo, Croce and Faff (2014) and Alsakka 
                                                          
2
 Alsakka et al (2014) suggest two channels through which banking risk can affect sovereign risk. First, the cost of 
bailing out banks can erode public resources and increase a nation’s vulnerability to default on its debts. Secondly, 
weakened banks will be less able to support economic growth through their role as a financial intermediary. While 
they find little evidence that sovereign rating assignments influence bank rating assignments in the pre-crisis period 
they do find that the former strongly affect the latter during the crisis period. It is also noted that sovereign ratings 
no longer provide a strict ceiling to bank ratings although the former are typically higher than the latter. They also 
find that the link between sovereign and bank ratings vary significantly across the three CRAs. While they do not 
provide evidence for individual countries (because they employ a pooled probit estimation method for the 21 
European countries in their sample) they do find that sovereign ratings have a greater influence on bank ratings for 
PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) countries than other European countries. This is established by 
estimating a separate pooled model for these countries. Our method that relies on time-series regressions will 
facilitate a comparison in CRAs herding behaviour for sovereign ratings by each individual country, which is a 
strength of our work. 
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and ap Gwilym (2010). We provide an additional dimension to the ongoing discussion about the 
inflated ratings and reputation factors. Second, we contribute to recent studies investigation of 
institutional herding among CRAs by introducing full country heterogeneity. We extend the 
literature on herding among rating agencies' sovereign assignments by conducting country-by-
country time-series tests to assess the lead-lag relationship among agencies and, to our 
knowledge, we are the first to do this. Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2010) assume that the lead-lag 
relationship is homogenous across countries. We argue that different rating agencies may have 
different levels of expertise (reputation) for different countries and it is not obvious that such 
homogeneity holds. We therefore conduct poolability tests to assess this assumption and find 
evidence of heterogeneity. Third, we consider the extent to which any apparent herding is 
intentional by assessing changes in herding behaviour between the pre-crisis and crisis periods.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature on 
credit rating assignments and identifies the gaps in the literature that directs our research 
hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data and Section 4 outlines the methods used for testing our 
hypotheses. Section 5 presents and discusses our empirical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes, 
shows policy relevance of this case study and outlines a direction for further research. 
 
2. Related Existing Literature and Building Hypotheses 
 
Empirical and theoretical research on CRAs and ratings assignments dates back to the 
late 1980s.  Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), Millon and Thakor (1985) and Cantor and Packer 
(1997) indirectly provide the theoretical foundation and intellectual trajectory for research that is 
underpinned by the theory of financial intermediation, see Leland and Pyle (1977), Allen (1990), 
Pagano and Jappelli (1993) among others. 
A frequently cited argument underpinned by empirical research is that CRAs do not 
assess risk better than market participants themselves. CRAs do not have, and cannot have, 
superior information to market participants about uncertainty and the degree of insolvency 
(illiquidity) of the rated firms (sovereigns).  Altman and Saunders (2001) show that CRAs may 
provide biased opinions since their ratings strategies are based on backward looking analyses 
rather than being forward looking. Amato and Furfine (2004) analyse changes of credit ratings 
assignments over business cycles to test the hypothesis about procyclical behaviour of CRAs. 
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They show that the opaque methodologies used by CRAs are conducted on a “through-the-cycle” 
basis, and not according to transitory fluctuations in credit quality. Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro 
(2009, 2012) explore a further interesting research question regarding the conflict of interest of 
CRAs that is linked with economic fundamentals.  CRAs overestimate ratings in good times 
(booms) when there are a large number of naive investors and the probability of losing their 
reputation is lower. Their results correspond with the situation that occurred during the GFC 
when a large number of issued ratings were downgraded. This particular issue is further extended 
by Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013) who link endogenous reputation and the variable market 
environment. They find that ratings quality is countercyclical. Ammer and Packer (2000) 
indicate that there is rating inconsistency for US financial firms. Cantor et al. (2001) reveals that 
the speculative grade of US banks has higher annual default rates than US non-banks. Morgan 
(2002) demonstrates that the difference in two separate CRAs’ bank rating assignments is 
explained by the inherently opaque nature of banks for those outside banks, including CRAs. 
Bannier, Behr and Gütler (2010) attempt to explain why unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than 
solicited ratings. Fulghieri, Strobl and Xia (2015) develop a dynamic rational expectations model 
that examines the incentive for CRAs to assign unsolicited credit ratings.  
Another strand of the recent literature addresses further important research and policy 
related questions that are linked to reputational effects, competition and the reliability of CRAs’ 
ratings assignments – see Becker and Milbourn (2011), Mariano (2012), Bolton, Freixas and 
Shapiro (2012), Manso (2013) and Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013). Alsakka, ap Gwilym and Vu 
(2014) attempt to provide a theoretical framework that explains why CRAs fail to make reliable 
rating assignments in terms of their timeliness and accuracy. Cantor et al (2000), Morgan (2002) 
and Becker and Milbourn (2011) challenge the reliability of ratings assignments with respect to 
their opaqueness and the degree of competition. Becker and Milbourn (2011) show that the 
competition among the three largest CRAs – Moody’s, S&P’s and Fitch Ratings – could cause 
the failure of adequate rating assignments.   
The above studies relates to research on information bias of rating assignments that is 
based on decision model theory. Following Banerjee (1994) this kind of explanation is based on 
the assumption that each decision maker considers the decisions taken by other decision makers 
in taking their own decision. Such a strategy leads to herding behaviour when individual agents 
copy what others do instead of using their own information and judgment. The literature on 
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herding behaviour is well established and extensive in the area of finance (Trueman, 1994, 
Wermers, 1999, Sias, 2004, Choi and Sias, 2009). Sias (2004) confirms the hypothesis about 
institutional herding. Thus, institutional investors follow each other when they buy or sell the 
same shares. However, they show that substantial differences exist across institutions although 
institutional investors follow similarly classified institutional investors.   
The majority of the literature on herding focuses on fund managers investing in stocks 
where there are a large number of investors and stocks. When investigating herding for CRAs 
there are primarily 3 agencies to consider. Hence, theoretical models of pricing strategy under 
oligopoly provide many relevant insights into the situation of a small number of CRAs making 
rating assignments (which is analogous to a small number of large firms deciding how to set 
prices). As we discussed, the notion underlying herding behaviour is that the action of one agent 
is influenced by that of other agents (Scharfestein and Stein, 1990, Benerjee, 1992, Choi and 
Sias, 2009). Within the context of sovereign rating agencies herding could be interpreted as one 
CRA’s sovereign ratings being influenced by another, even though the agencies should produce 
independent ratings.
3
 The concept of herding behaviour in the context of institutional investors 
can be transformed into the decision process of ratings assignments. There are a few recent 
studies that attempt to apply it to rating assignments, e.g. Guttler and Wahrenburg (2007), 
Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2010) and Lugo, Croce and Faff (2014). 
Given that there are three main rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s and S&P’s) the notion of 
herding could be regarded as analogous to the microeconomic price leadership theory of 
oligopoly pricing. In this model firms do not explicitly collude in setting prices, however, a 
leading firm changes prices and the other firms follow by changing their prices in line with the 
leader. A modification of this theory allows for the price leader to change (possibly frequently) 
through time such that when any one firm changes its price the others follow.  
Applying the price leadership theory to the three sovereign CRAs and considering the 
possibility of intentional and spurious herding more generally raises the question of whether one 
agency systematically leads in the setting (and changing) of country ratings. This suggests a 
range of hypotheses that include the following: 
                                                          
3
 In principle CRAs could provide the same ratings for a country independently because they base decisions on the 
same information. However, while different agencies produce similar ratings they are not completely the same (as is 
evident by casual inspection of comparative ratings).  
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Hypothesis 1: One CRA leads the others in changing ratings at all times and for all 
countries. This suggests that the follower CRA’s assignments are herding towards the leader’s 
ratings for all countries during all time periods. 
Hypothesis 2: One CRA leads the others in changing ratings at all times for a particular 
country or countries. This suggests that the follower CRA’s assignments are herding towards the 
leader’s ratings for some countries during all time periods. 
In this case, one CRA may develop, or be perceived as having developed, superior 
expertise in setting the rating for specific countries (perhaps based upon past performance). If the 
other agencies recognise this they may be inclined to follow the leader’s changes in ratings - this 
would be intentional herding. Under this hypothesis one CRA may be viewed as the leader for 
one country while another may be considered the leader for another country. It may also be that 
there is no single recognised leader for some countries. This hypothesis would give rise to 
heterogeneity of leadership across countries. These hypotheses reflect current knowledge about 
the quality of rating analysts (Bar-Issac and Shapiro, 2011; White 2010). 
Hypothesis 3: One CRA leads the others in changing ratings at different times for 
particular countries. This suggests that the follower CRA’s assignments are herding towards the 
leader’s ratings for at least some countries during particular time periods. 
In this case, while there is no one recognised dominant agency the actions of one agency 
changing its rating causes other agencies to reconsider their corresponding rating such that they 
are likely to also change their rating.
4
 This hypothesis would give rise to heterogeneity of 
leadership through time (possibly for a particular set of countries). If the degree of herding 
changes when the environment changes (as occurred after the GFC) this could indicate that 
herding is intentional. If the change in herding (leadership) occurs when there is no clear change 
in the environmental state this would suggest that herding is spurious.  
Gavriilidis et al (2013) identify motives for traders, that we suggest can also be applied to 
CRAs, to intentionally herd as well as suggesting that herding can be unintentional (spurious 
herding). They suggest two incentives for an investor to herd intentionally as follows. First, the 
                                                          
4
 Alsakka et al (2014) suggest that in terms of bank ratings assignments over the GFC period S&P’s tend to be the 
most independent while Moody’s has the greatest likelihood of assigning multiple notch downgrades. Indeed, they 
indicate that CRAs exhibit clear differences in when and whether to alter both bank and sovereign rating 
assignments. This suggests that there may not be herding during the crisis. Having said this, the independence of 
different CRAs’ bank rating assignments is evident only in the pre-crisis period. They find strong links between the 
CRAs’s assignments during the crisis period. They find that S&P’s are most likely to be the first to change bank 
ratings (suggesting that this CRA is concerned with reputational credibility).  
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investor has a view of their position relative to that of their peers and those who believe they are 
less able to make appropriate decisions may seek to imitate the decisions (trades) of those 
viewed as more able. Second, an investor may see a positive externality from following another 
investor’s behaviour. For example, fund managers may reap “informational payoffs” by 
following the behaviour of managers who they believe are better informed (there are real or 
presumed informational asymmetries). Indeed, herding may yield “reputational payoffs” when 
managers (CRAs) are being judged relatively. An investor/manager (CRA) that lacks confidence 
in their ability may seek to mimick their peers who are deemed superior and hence conceal their 
(believed) inferiority. For CRAs any lack of confidence may not necessarily be for all rating 
assignments rather it may be for certain countries or during particular time periods or for certain 
countries at a particular period in time. 
The appearance of herding that is spurious may arise if factors common to managers 
(CRAs) cause correlations in their trades (ratings assignments). For fund managers this could be 
the case if they are relatively homogeneous in terms of education, experience, information 
processing skills, the signals received and the regulatory environment they operate in. CRAs that 
work in teams (where any inadequacies of any team members can be compensated by other 
members) may also exhibit similar homogeneity. Hence, trades (rating assignments) may be 
correlated among managers (CRAs) contemporaneously or possibly with a (short) time lag with 
similar decisions being made independently.  
Analyses attempting to distinguish intentional and spurious herding of fund managers 
have previously considered differences in the degree of herding for environmental states 
measured using market returns, market/sector volatility, market/sector trading volume and 
regulatory changes. For CRAs an obvious change in environment occurred after the GFC that 
first affected the solvency of banks and then the solvency of nations – which is the focus of our 
research.
5
 Hence, a CRA that felt less able to make appropriate assignments for some, or all, 
countries may feel a greater need to conceal their (believed) lower ability during the crisis period 
                                                          
5
 Alsakka et al (2014) argue that ratings quality may be related to the business cycle. In the boom years (prior to the 
crisis) CRAs may not be overly concerned about ratings accuracy and that this may have caused ratings to be 
inflated prior to 2010. However, during the GFC (when they are subject to greater scrutiny) more effort may have 
been aimed at ensuring rating accuracy so causing a change in how assignments are made. If ratings were inflated 
prior to the crisis this could mean substantial downgrading during the crisis. Indeed, Alsakka et al (2014) investigate 
whether CRAs bank ratings policy changed from 2008 – 2013 compared with the pre-2008 period. Alsakka et al 
(2014) also suggest that regulatory changes were made to address shortcomings in how CRAs produced ratings prior 
to the GFC. Such changes may cause changes in how CRAs make assignments pre-crisis and during the crisis.   
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when CRAs, and their assignments, were subject to increased scrutiny due to accusations that 
their inaccurate (and perhaps opaque) ratings were partly to blame for the GFC.
6
 Under such 
conditions one might expect an increased degree of intentional herding during the GFC.
7
 In 
contrast, if CRAs do not feel inferior to others they have no incentive to herd and so any herding 
that appears to be evident should not change because it is unintentional. Following Lugo et al 
(2014) we expect that to the extent there is intentional herding S&P’s is the most likely agency to 
be the leader and Fitch the most likely follower due to the relative amounts of the CRAs’ 
reputational capital. 
 
3. Data Sample 
 
We estimate our models using start of period monthly data on sovereign ratings for 
Moody’s, S&P’s and Fitch Ratings in pairs.8 Ratings are measured on a 20 point ordinal scale 
following the literature – see, for example, Alsaka and ap Gwilym (2010). Thus, the highest 
rating (AAA) is represented by 20, the second highest rating (AA+ or AA1) is 19, the rating 
Caa3/CCC– = 2, with all lower ratings (Ca/CC, C/C, LD/RD, D/DDD, DD, D) being set to 1 (the 
lowest rating category) because they are not comparable across CRAs.  
Results could be obtained for 24 countries for the Fitch and Moody’s CRA pairing, 28 
countries for the Fitch and S&P’s pairing and 23 countries for the Moody’s and S&P’s pairing. 
The sovereign ratings from Fitch Ratings and S&P’s are publicly available.9  We obtained the 
                                                          
6
 Alsakka et al (2014) suggest that the GFC has challenged the previously held belief that developed countries’ 
sovereign debts are relatively safe – especially in countries such as Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain 
(PIIGS). They further suggest that this crisis period placed unique pressures on CRAs in terms of sovereign credit 
rating assignment downgrades. Given that bond yields and CDS prices would publically indicate the market’s 
sentiment of a country’s risk a CRA that appeared to act too slowly in downgrading a rating may lose credibility. 
Conversely, if a CRA downgrades a sovereign’s rating too quickly this may anger politicians and commentators 
causing them to be blamed for the worsening crisis. A CRA taking prompt action in downgrading sovereign ratings 
may be viewed as a leader in ratings assignments. 
7
 Alsakka et al (2014) find that although CRAs’ bank rating assignments are independent during the pre-crisis period 
they become dependent during the GFC period with S&P’s being the leader in terms of European bank rating 
downgrades. 
8
 Applying ordered choice estimation methods to time-series data on the change in ratings that changes relatively 
infrequently means that securing converged estimates becomes increasingly difficult as more covariates are added to 
a model. Hence, we consider the CRAs in pairs with 2 variables in each equation rather than all 3 CRAs together 
with 3 regressors in each equation to ensure that valid estimation results can be obtained for as many countries as 
possible. 
9
 https://www.fitchratings.com/web.../ratings/sovereign_ratings_history.xls [Accessed 23 May, 2013] 
https://uvalibraryfeb.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/sovereignspratings2011dec.pdf [Accessed 23 May, 2013] 
https://uvalibraryfeb.wordpress.com/2012/02/03/country-sovereign-ratings-moodys-fitch-sp/ 
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data sample for Moody’s sovereign ratings directly from the Agency. In Appendix 1, we provide 
the list of all countries in our sample with the corresponding 3 letter identifier. We select the 
countries to include in our analysis according to the following criteria. First, data is available for 
at least 2 CRAs for that country and second, the rating changes at least once for at least 2 CRAs 
for that country. Third, there are at least 60 overlapping observations for at least 1 pair of CRAs 
(this is because we use ordinal choice models that require large samples due to the nonlinear 
estimation method). Fourth, estimation converges and estimates are obtained for all coefficients 
in the test equations for a particular country. We denote the ratings assigned by Fitch, Moody’s 
and S&P’s with RF, RM and RS, respectively 
 
4. Methodology 
 
A Granger non-causality (GNC) style test is proposed for investigating the above 
hypotheses applied to the three pairs of CRAs’ ratings. This method is particularly appropriate 
for examining herding because it tests for precedence and so allows one CRA to observe another 
CRA’s assignment before making their assignment. A GNC-style method has been employed to 
analyse the lead-lag relationship between different CRAs’ bank rating assignments by, for 
example, Alsakka et al’s (2014). The only previous application of a similar method to sovereign 
ratings is by Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2010), however, our work extends theirs, first, by allowing 
heterogeneity across countries (as well as through time) and, second, by controlling for habit 
behaviour when testing for herding.
10
 Our results include tests applied to the 3 CRA pairings for 
each country – we are not aware of any previous analysis of credit rating herding that applies 
GNC-style tests for individual countries.  
To illustrate the basic GNC-style test consider the following one lag bivariate 
autoregressive specification where Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡 denotes the change in rating assignment made by CRA 
𝑋 for country 𝑖 in time period 𝑡 and Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents the change rating assignment made by CRA 
𝑌 for the same country and time period. We use the change in rating assignment because it 
                                                          
10
 Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2010) apply ordered probit methods in their empirical investigation of the lead-lag 
linkage between different CRAs’ bank rating assignments to data pooled across countries for CRA pairings in GNC-
style regressions that exclude own lagged ratings (only the other CRA’s past ratings appear as regressors). Hence, 
the exclusion of own lagged ratings may cause omitted variable bias. Our method ameliorates this possibility by 
including own lagged ratings. 
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reduces both the number of categories in the variables and the number of lags required in the 
model which reduces any problems in obtaining convergence in estimation.
11
 
 
Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛼1𝑖Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑖Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑢1𝑖𝑡   (1) 
Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽1𝑖Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑖Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑢2𝑖𝑡   (2) 
 
These equations are estimated individually by ordered probit methods using time-series 
regressions for each country.
12
 Note that 𝑍𝑖𝑡
∗ = Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡
∗ , Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡
∗  denotes the unobserved dependent 
variable that is related to the observed dependent variable, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 = Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡, Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡 , (assuming 𝐽 
categories) as follows:  
 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 1  𝑖𝑓 𝑍𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ Λ1,i
𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗 𝑖𝑓 Λj−1,i < 𝑍𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ Λj,i
𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝐽 𝑖𝑓 ΛJ−1,i < 𝑍𝑖𝑡
∗
  
 
where, j = 2, 3, … , J; Λj−1,i = 𝜆𝑋,𝑗−1,𝑖, 𝜆𝑌,𝑗−1,𝑖  and 𝜆𝑋,𝑗−1,𝑖  and 𝜆𝑌,𝑗−1,𝑖  are unknown limit points 
to be estimated with the coefficients in equation (1) and (2), respectively. 
 
The basic interpretation of the GNC-style (and other exclusion tests) is: 
 
(A) GNC-style tests: 
 
                                                          
11
 Given that ordinal data is bounded it is unlikely to exhibit significant nonstationarity. In particular, because ratings 
take on values between 1 and 20 the mean, if not constant, will be converging towards a constant and will certainly 
be finite. Further, the variance cannot be infinite given the boundaries on the values that a rating can take on and 
since the autoregressive covariances will not exceed the variance they will also be finite. Hence, we may regard 
ratings data as intrinsically covariance stationary and any high autoregressive (habit) coefficients found in the model 
will likely reflect that ratings change infrequently such that this period’s rating often equals last period’s value rather 
than nonstationarity. Nevertheless, to address the high persistence on the own lag variables (found in initial 
experiments based on OLS regressions) we use differenced data. This also helps overcome any residual 
autocorrelation evident in undifferenced data and reduces the number of categories that should help ensure 
convergence in estimation. Further, we note that for only 2 out of the 35 countries or 8 out of 150 equations for 
which (1) and (2) are estimated is the sample size below 100 observations which should also enhance our ability to 
obtain convergence in estimation. 
12
 The use of ordered choice models recognises the ordinal nature of the dependent variables. We also consider 
pooled estimation of (1) and (2) to assess the heterogeneity of herding across countries with poolability tests. 
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(a) Herding occurs if CRA 𝑋 (𝑌) follows 𝑌’s (𝑋′𝑠) previous assignment when making its 
current assignment, which is indicated by 𝛼2𝑖 > 0 (𝛽1𝑖 > 0).
13
 
(b) Adverse herding occurs if 𝛼2𝑖 < 0 (𝛽1𝑖 < 0) because CRA 𝑋 (𝑌) reverses 𝑌’s (𝑋′𝑠) 
previous assignment when making its current assignment.
14
  
(c) There is no significant herding if CRA 𝑌 (𝑋) does not temporally follow 𝑋’s (𝑌′𝑠) 
rating assignments, which is indicated by 𝛼2𝑖 = 0 (𝛽1𝑖 = 0). 
 
(B) Habit behaviour tests: 
 
(a) Habit rating assignment (or trend following) occurs if 𝛼1𝑖 > 0 (𝛽2𝑖 > 0) because 
CRA 𝑋 (𝑌) follows its own previous assignment when making its current assignment. 
(b) Contrarian rating assignment occurs if 𝛼1𝑖 < 0  (𝛽2𝑖 < 0)  because CRA 𝑋  (𝑌) 
reverses its own previous assignment when making its current assignment.  
(c) There is no significant autocorrelation in a CRA’s own rating assignment if 𝛼1𝑖 = 0 
(𝛽2𝑖 = 0), that is, CRA 𝑋 (𝑌) does not temporally follow its own rating assignments.  
 
 We use a model with only one lag because it gives an unambiguous interpretation in terms 
of the signs of coefficients of interest and thereby facilitates their interpretation within the above 
hypotheses. This lag length is also indicated by the Schwartz Information Criterion (SC) for the 
time-series regressions (see discussion below). 
 We use time-series regressions to examine the lead-lag relationship between ratings rather 
than pooling the countries together (as is done in, for examples, Guttler and Wahrenburg (2007) 
and Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2010)) because pooling assumes the homogeneity of (slope) 
                                                          
13
 Within the context of security analysts recommending whether to buy, hold or sell a security with 5 possible 
recommendations (strong buy, buy, hold, sell, strong sell) Welch (2000) argues that it would not be surprising that 
many analysts’ current extreme recommendations of strong sell or strong buy will subsequently move towards the 
consensus. It is suggested that there is a strong state dependence in the analysts’ revision process such that the 5 (in 
this instance) probability vectors (for each recommendation) are not identical (except with different means). Hence, 
a positive correlation among analysts’ recommendations may be expected without necessarily reflecting herding. 
However, such a criticism does not obviously apply to CRAs’ assignments of sovereign ratings – for example, why 
should a highly (lowly) rated nation have some natural tendency away from that rating?  
14
 The notion of adverse herding within the context of fund managers occurs when investors mistrust the market 
consensus of trades and so increase their reliance on their own judgment of asset prices – see, for example, Klein 
(2013, p. 295). Analogously, a CRA that assigns ratings in the opposite direction to another CRA is strongly 
disagreeing with that agency’s evaluation of a rating assignment and is demonstrating increased confidence in their 
own judgment, which may be referred to as adverse herding. 
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coefficients across countries. If there are significant differences in slope coefficients across 
countries drawing inferences based upon pooled results can be misleading. To determine whether 
the use of a pooled estimator would be appropriate for our data and countries we apply the 
poolability test discussed in Kapetanious (2003) and Chortareas and Kaptenious (2009). To 
illustrate the method of this Hausman-style test we define the matrix of slope coefficients for 
country 𝑖 in (1) as 𝜶𝒊
′ = (𝛼1𝑖, 𝛼2𝑖). The hypotheses are: 
 
𝐻0: 𝜶𝑖 = 𝜶  ∀ 𝑖 (3) 
𝐻1: 𝜶𝑖 ≠ 𝜶  for any 𝑖 (4) 
 
The test statistic for a given 𝑖 is: 
 
𝑆𝑇𝑖 = (?̂?𝑖 − ?̃?)
′𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑖 − ?̃?)
−1(?̂?𝑖 − ?̃?)  (5) 
 
where ?̂?𝑖 is the time-series estimated slope coefficient estimator for the given individual 𝑖 and ?̃? 
is a consistent pooled data estimator that assumes homogeneity of slope coefficients (we will use 
the standard pooled ordered choice estimator given the generally large time-series dimension for 
each country). It is assumed that the estimators for both ?̂?𝑖  and ?̃?  are consistent and 
asymptotically normal and that the estimator for ?̃? is also efficient under the poolability null 
hypothesis.  
Even though the variance is not assumed to be efficient Chortareas and Kaptenious 
(2009) argue that as 𝑁 → ∞ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̂?𝑖, ?̃?) will become negligible such that (6) may be used to 
estimate 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑖 − ?̃?) based upon a consistent estimator of 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑖). We use the Huber White 
(QML) robust coefficient variances and covariance estimators in both pooled and time-series 
regressions.
15
    
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑖 − ?̃?) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑖) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?)  (6) 
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 Hence, for our application the test statistic is: 𝑆𝑇𝑖 = ([
?̂?1𝑖
?̂?2𝑖
] − [
?̃?1
?̃?2
])
′
{𝑉𝑎𝑟 [
?̂?1𝑖
?̂?2𝑖
] + 𝑉𝑎𝑟 [
?̃?1
?̃?2
]}
−1
([
?̂?1𝑖
?̂?2𝑖
] − [
?̃?1
?̃?2
]), 
⟹ 𝑆𝑇𝑖 = 𝐷𝑒𝑡 × [(?̂?1𝑖 − ?̃?1)
2{𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?2𝑖) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?2)} − 2(?̂?1𝑖 − ?̃?1)(?̂?2𝑖 − ?̃?2){𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̂?1𝑖 , ?̂?2𝑖) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?1, ?̃?2)} +
(?̂?2𝑖 − ?̃?2)
2{𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?1𝑖) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?1)}], where 𝐷𝑒𝑡 = [
1
{𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?1𝑖)+𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?1)}{𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?2𝑖)+𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?2)}−{𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̂?1𝑖,?̂?2𝑖)+𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̃?1,?̃?2)}
2]. 
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Chortareas and Kaptenious (2009) suggest that the asymptotic distribution of 𝑆𝑇𝑖 for a 
given 𝑖 is (where 𝑘 denotes the number of slope coefficients): 
 
𝑆𝑇𝑖
𝑑
→ 𝜒𝑘
2 ,  𝑇 → ∞  (7) 
 
Although a statistic 𝑆𝑇
𝑆 = 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑆𝑇𝑖 is developed to test the poolability null, equation (3), it 
is noted that using 𝑆𝑇
𝑆 is not necessary to conduct the test. A large individual 𝑆𝑇𝑖 is sufficient to 
reject the null. We therefore calculate 𝑆𝑇𝑖 for each country and find evidence against poolability 
if the null is rejected for any 𝑖. If poolability is rejected this implies that time-series regressions 
should be used for each country to allow heterogeneity of parameters and thereby produce 
reliable results.  
The above GNC-style tests provide answers to Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. To assess 
Hypothesis 3 we use shift dummy variables to allow coefficients to change at the pre-identified 
break point and conduct the GNC-style tests for both pre- and post-break periods without losing 
as many degrees of freedom as would be the case with sample splitting.
16
 To enable the 
application of the test we only consider splitting the sample into two sub-periods. A 
predetermined period is appropriate for assessing any changes in the degree of herding in 
different environmental states (such as before and after the GFC). To test whether the herding 
coefficients change after the GFC (we approximate this with the break point being between May 
2007 and June 2007 following Lugo et al 2014) based upon time-series regressions we define the 
following dummy variable as:
17
 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑡 = {
0 𝑡 ≤ 𝑀𝑎𝑦 2007
1 𝑡 ≥ 𝐽𝑢𝑛𝑒 2007
   (8) 
 
The modified specification used to test for parameter non-constancy is based upon: 
                                                          
16
 This test would not be able to identify a situation where the leading rating agency is frequently changing through 
time. However, a frequently changing leader agency would be very difficult to observationally distinguish from no 
rating assignment leadership behaviour. Further, it is likely that for many countries there is some degree of rating 
inertia such that rating changes are relatively infrequent. Hence, it is unlikely that there would be a large number of 
changes in leadership through time simply because there are comparatively few rating changes. 
17
 We use this sample break point to ensure that the first crisis based downgrades in sovereign ratings that occurred 
late in 2007 are in our definition of the crisis period. 
 17 
 
 
Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛼1𝑖Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿1𝑖(𝐷𝑖𝑡 × Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛼2𝑖Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑖(𝐷𝑖𝑡 × Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝑢1𝑖𝑡   (9) 
Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽1𝑖Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑖(𝐷𝑖𝑡 × Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽2𝑖Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝑖(𝐷𝑖𝑡 × Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝑢2𝑖𝑡   (10) 
 
The hypothesis tests that we consider are:
18
 
 
(C) GNC-style tests: 
 
(a) Herding behaviour of CRA 𝑋 (𝑌) exhibits a significant change during the GFC if 
𝛿2𝑖 ≠ 0 (𝛾1𝑖 ≠ 0).  
 
(i) When 𝛿2𝑖 > 0 (𝛾1𝑖 > 0) the degree of herding of CRA 𝑋 (𝑌) has increased.  
(ii) When 𝛿2𝑖 < 0 (𝛾1𝑖 < 0) the degree of herding of CRA 𝑋 (𝑌) has decreased. 
 
(b) Herding behaviour of CRA 𝑋 (𝑌) exhibits no significant change during the GFC if 
𝛿2𝑖 = 0 (𝛾1𝑖 = 0).  
 
The herding coefficients up to and including May 2007 are 𝛼2𝑖 and 𝛽1𝑖 and (strictly) after May 
2007 are 𝛼2𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑖 and 𝛽1𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑖.
19
 
 
5. Results 
 
This section discusses the following results in order: pooled regressions and poolability 
tests, full period individual country regressions, split sample individual country regressions. 
 
5.1 Pooled regressions and poolability tests 
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 The focus of our attention will be on changes in herding behaviour and we do not present an investigation of 
changes in the habit coefficients. 
19
 Because the coefficients after the change are a sum of two values, t-tests for whether a coefficient is statistically 
significant after the change require the variance of that sum to be calculated. This test can be implemented as 
follows. For generality denote the sum of coefficients as 𝜃𝑘𝑖 + 𝜑𝑘𝑖 , where 𝜃𝑘𝑖 = 𝛼𝑘𝑖 , 𝛿𝑘𝑖  and 𝜑𝑘𝑖 = 𝛽𝑘𝑖 , 𝛾𝑘𝑖  with 
𝑘 = 1, 2 . The hypotheses to be tested are, 𝐻0: 𝜃𝑘𝑖 + 𝜑𝑘𝑖 = 0 ; 𝐻1: 𝜃𝑘𝑖 + 𝜑𝑘𝑖 ≠ 0 . The t-statistic is: 𝑡 =
 
?̂?𝑘𝑖+?̂?𝑘𝑖
√𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑘𝑖+?̂?𝑘𝑖)
, where, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑘𝑖 + ?̂?𝑘𝑖) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑘𝑖) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?𝑘𝑖) + 2𝐶𝑜𝑣(?̂?𝑘𝑖?̂?𝑘𝑖). 
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Previous analyses of the lead-lag relationship between CRAs pool all countries together 
in one regression – see Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2010). We therefore start by estimating (1) and 
(2) for all 3 pairs of CRAs using pooled ordered probit regressions and the results are reported in 
Table 1. The probability value of the likelihood ratio statistic, p[LR], is less than 0.050 in all 
cases suggesting that the hypothesis that all regression coefficients are zero is rejected for all 6 
equations. Further, the GNC (herding) coefficient is significant and positive at the 5% level in all 
6 equations. This suggests bi-directional Granger-causality for all three rating agency pairings. 
That is, Fitch follows Moody’s ratings and Moody’s follows Fitch’s ratings while Fitch follows 
S&P’s ratings and S&P’s follows Fitch’s ratings. Similarly, Moody’s follows S&P’s ratings and 
S&P’s follows Moody’s ratings. These results suggest that all of the CRAs herd towards each 
others’ ratings with no clear leader or follower. The habit coefficient is positive and significant 
for only 2 of the 6 equations: on Fitch’s autoregressive coefficient when Moody’s is the other 
CRA and on S&P’s autoregressive coefficient when Moody’s is the other CRA. This suggests 
that these CRAs are influenced by their own previous rating assignments. 
However, because the models are estimated using data pooled across all countries it is 
possible that there is heterogeneity of the lead/lag relationships across countries that is not 
apparent in the pooled regressions. This is confirmed by the poolability test statistic, 𝑆𝑇
𝑆, that 
rejects the poolability of the data across countries for all 6 equations and suggests that the models 
estimated for the individual countries will typically yield different coefficients from those 
obtained from pooled estimation. 
Further, poolability is rejected if any one of the individual country’s poolability test 
statistics, 𝑆𝑇𝑖, exceeds the 5% critical value. The individual country poolability tests are reported 
in Table 2. They reject the poolability null for 19 out of 24 (79%) countries when Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 , 
denoting the change in Fitch’s rating, is the dependent variable and in 15 out of 24 (63%) 
countries when Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 , the change in Moody’s assignment, is the dependent variable for the 
CRA pairing of Fitch and Moody’s. The poolability null is rejected for 8 out of 28 (29%) 
countries when Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable and in 11 out of 28 (39%) countries when Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡, 
the change in S&P’s rating, is the dependent variable for the CRA pairing of Fitch and S&P’s. 
The poolability null is rejected for 8 out of 23 (35%) countries when Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the dependent 
variable and in 14 out of 23 (61%) countries when Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable for the CRA 
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pairing of Moody’s and S&P’s. Overall, 75 out of 150 (49%) individual poolability tests are 
rejected and poolability is rejected in each equation for each country pairing suggesting clear 
rejection of the poolability null and the need to estimate models country by country to reveal the 
heterogeneity across countries. 
 
5.2 Full period individual country regressions 
 
We therefore proceed to consider the time-series estimation of (1) and (2) for each CRA 
pairing for each individual country. To determine whether one lag of each variable in each 
equation is sufficient we estimate versions of (1) and (2) with 1, 2, 3 and 4 lags on each variable 
using the same sample period (to ensure comparability) for each CRA pairing and country and 
select the lag length based on the equation that has the minimum SC. Table 3 reports the SC for 
Fitch and Moody’s and both equations for all 24 countries indicate 1 lag except for Greece with 
Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 as the dependent variable that indicates 2 lags. Table 4 reports the SC for Fitch and S&P’s 
and both equations for all 28 countries indicate 1 lag except for Romania with Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡  as the 
dependent variable that indicates 2 lags. Table 5 reports the SC for Moody’s and S&P’s and both 
equations for all 23 countries indicate 1 lag according except for Latvia with Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡  as the 
dependent variable that indicates 3 lags. Thus, 147 out of the 150 (98%) estimated equations 
indicate 1 lag. This suggests strong support for estimating all models with a lag length of 1. We 
therefore estimate equations (1) and (2) using the full available time-series sample to test our 
hypotheses. 
Table 6 reports results for the Fitch and Moody’s CRA pairing. For 4 countries (ARG, 
CYP, ITA and LIT) there is a positive and significant (at the 5% level) coefficient on Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 in 
the equation where Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable indicating that Fitch’s current rating follows 
(herds towards) last period’s rating assigned by Moody’s. For no countries is this coefficient 
negative and significant indicating that Fitch’s current rating does not move away from (adverse 
herd against) Moody’s rating assigned last period for any country. Indeed, there are no instances 
of any CRA engaging in significant adverse herding against any other CRA for any pairing in 
any country. For 4 countries (ICE, LAT, RUS and TUR) there is evidence that Moody’s current 
rating follows (herds towards) Fitch’s rating assigned last period. These results suggest the 
unambiguous inference that Moody’s is the leader and Fitch is the follower for 4 countries 
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(ARG, CYP, ITA and LIT) and that Fitch is the leader and Moody’s is the follower for 4 
countries (ICE, LAT, RUS and TUR).  
For 3 countries (ARG, ICE and RUS) there is a positive and significant coefficient on 
Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 in the equation where Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡  is the dependent variable suggesting that Fitch tends to 
follow its own past rating in making its current assignment (habit behaviour) for these countries. 
It is notable that in 2 of these countries (ICE and RUS) there is evidence that Moody’s follows 
Fitch’s rating confirming the independence of Fitch in making assignments for these countries. 
In 1 country (ITA) there is a negative and significant coefficient on Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 in the equation 
where Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable suggesting that Fitch tends to reverse its own past rating 
in making its current assignment (contrarian habit behaviour) for this country. In this country 
there is evidence that Fitch follows Moody’s rating confirming Fitch’s tendency to herd towards 
Moody’s (rather than their own) rating in making their assignment for this country. For 1 country 
(URU) there is evidence of habit behaviour in Moody’s assignment and for 1 country (ROM) 
there is evidence of significant contrarian habit behaviour by Moody’s.  
Table 7 reports results for the Fitch and S&P’s CRA pairing. For 10 countries (CYP, 
DOM, ECU, GRE, INO, IRE, JAM, POR, SPA and TUR) there is a positive and significant  
coefficient on Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡−1  in the equation where Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡  is the dependent variable indicating that 
Fitch’s current rating follows (herds towards) last period’s rating assigned by S&P’s. For 6 
countries (GRE, HOG, ICE, INO, RUS and URU) there is evidence that S&P’s current rating 
follows (herds towards) Fitch’s rating assigned last period. These results suggest the 
unambiguous inference that S&P’s is the leader and Fitch is the follower for 8 countries (CYP, 
DOM, ECU, IRE, JAM, POR, SPA and TUR) and that Fitch is the leader and S&P’s is the 
follower for 4 countries (HOG, ICE, RUS and URU). For GRE and INO the evidence suggest bi-
directional Granger-causality where S&P’s appears to follow Fitch’s past ratings while Fitch 
simultaneously follows S&P’s past rating assignment. Two points about these inferences are 
worth noting. First, the coefficient on Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡−1  in the equation where Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡  is the dependent 
variable is more than (less than) that of the coefficient on Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 in the equation where Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 is 
the dependent variable suggesting that Fitch’s (S&P’s) tendency to follow S&P’s (Fitch’s) past 
rating assignment is greater than the other way around for GRE (INO). Second, these results 
might indicate a change in rating leadership through time for these countries. This issue may be 
assessed by consideration of whether the models’ coefficients change through time.  
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For 4 countries (ARG, ICE, INO and RUS) there is a positive and significant coefficient 
on Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 in the equation where Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable suggesting that Fitch tends to 
follow its own past rating in making its current assignment (habit behaviour) for these countries. 
It is notable that in 2 of these countries (ICE and RUS) there is unambiguous evidence that 
S&P’s follows Fitch’s rating confirming the independence of Fitch in making assignments for 
these countries. In no countries is there a negative and significant coefficient on Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 in the 
equation where Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable suggesting that Fitch does not tend to reverse its 
own past rating in making its current assignment (contrarian habit behaviour) for any country.  
For 2 countries (ECU and POR) there is evidence of habit behaviour in S&P’s assignment while 
for 2 countries (BRA and URU) there is evidence of significant contrarian habit behaviour by 
S&P’s. In both ECU and POR there is evidence that Fitch follows S&P’s rating confirming the 
independence of S&P’s in making assignments for these countries. For URU the contrarian habit 
behaviour by S&P’s coincides with, and is confirming of, the evidence that S&P’s tends to herd 
towards Fitch’s assignments for this country.  
Table 8 reports results for the Moody’s and S&P’s CRA pairing. For 14 countries (ARG, 
ECU, GRE, ICE, INO, IRE, JAM, NEW, PHI, POR, ROM, SLO, THA and VEN) there is a 
positive and significant  coefficient on Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 in the equation where Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the dependent 
variable indicating that Moody’s current rating follows (herds towards) last period’s rating 
assigned by S&P’s. For 5 countries (ARG, CYP, INO, RUS and SLO) there is evidence that 
S&P’s current rating follows (herds towards) Moody’s rating assigned last period. These results 
suggest the unambiguous inference that S&P’s is the leader and Moody’s is the follower for 11 
countries (ECU, GRE, ICE, IRE, JAM, NEW, PHI, POR, ROM, THA and VEN) and that 
Moody’s is the leader and S&P’s is the follower for 2 countries (CYP and RUS). For 3 countries 
(ARG, INO and SLO) the evidence suggest bi-directional Granger-causality where S&P’s 
appears to follow Moody’s past ratings while Moody’s simultaneously follows S&P’s past rating 
assignment. We note that the coefficients on Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡−1  in the equations where Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the 
dependent variable are more than (less than) the coefficients on Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 in the equations where 
Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡  is the dependent variable for ARG and INO (SLO) suggesting that S&P’s (Moody’s) 
tendency to follow Moody’s (S&P’s) past rating assignment is greater than the other way around 
for these countries. This bi-directional causality might indicate a change in rating assignment 
leadership through time for these countries.  
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For 2 countries (THA and URU) there is a positive and significant coefficient on 
Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 in the equation where Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable suggesting that Moody’s tends 
to follow its own past rating in making its current assignment (habit behaviour) for this country. 
In 1 of these countries (THA) there is unambiguous evidence that S&P’s follows Moody’s rating 
perhaps confirming the independence of Moody’s in making assignments for this country. In 3 
countries (ICE, JAM and ROM) there is a negative and significant coefficient on Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 in the 
equation where Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡  is the dependent variable suggesting that Moody’s tends to reverse its 
own past rating in making its current assignment (contrarian habit behaviour) for these countries. 
In all 3 of these countries there is unambiguous evidence that Moody’s follows S&P’s rating 
confirming Moody’s tendency to herd towards S&P’s (rather than its own) rating in making its 
assignment for these countries. For 4 countries (ECU, ICE, POR and SLO) there is evidence of 
habit behaviour in S&P’s assignment however there is no evidence of significant contrarian habit 
behaviour by S&P’s for any country. In ECU, ICE, POR and SLO there is evidence that 
Moody’s follows S&P’s rating confirming the independence of S&P’s in making assignments for 
these countries. This conclusion is reinforced for ICE because there is evidence that Moody’s 
engages in contrarian habit behaviour for this country.  
Overall there is evidence of leadership/follower behaviour between Fitch and Moody’s 
for 8 out of 24 (33%) countries, between Fitch and S&P’s in 14 out of 28 (50%) countries and 
between Moody’s and S&P’s for 16 out of 23 (70%) countries.20 As might be expected S&P’s is 
the leader for more countries than the other CRAs although it is not the leader for all countries. 
Perhaps unexpectedly Fitch is not less of a leader or more of a follower than Moody’s. 
Table 9 summarises the full-sample individual GNC results by country for all 3 CRAs to 
provide insights into the distribution of leadership across the 3 CRAs for each country. The 
notation used in the table is as follows. If a CRA unambiguously leads the other for any pairing 
for a particular country this is indicated with the letter “L” in that CRA’s column. If there is bi-
directional Granger-causality (dual leadership) this is indicated with an “L” in the column 
headed “Dual”. The CRA with the largest GNC coefficient when there is bi-directional Granger-
causality is indicated with the symbol “F” (Fitch), “M” (Moody’s) or “S” S&P’s in the “Dual” 
column. The absence of leadership is indicated by a blank entry while “-” indicates that 
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 There is evidence of habit behaviour or contrarian habit behaviour between Fitch and Moody’s in 6 out of 24 
(25%) countries, between Fitch and S&P’s for 8 out of 28 (29%) countries and between Moody’s and S&P’s in 8 out 
of 23 (35%) countries. 
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estimation results are unavailable for a particular CRA pairing in a specific country. When a 
CRA’s leadership is confirmed by it exhibiting positive habit behaviour this is indicated by 
“H*”, where * denotes F for Fitch, M for Moody’s and S for S&P’s. Leadership that is 
reinforced by contrarian habit behaviour is denoted with “C*”. 
From Table 9 there is no evidence of any CRA leading or following another CRA for 11 
of the 35 countries which at first sight appears to suggest an absence of herding for many (almost 
one third) of the nations considered. However, for only one of these countries (BRA) are results 
on leadership available for all 3 CRAs which means that such a conclusion could be partly due to 
missing information rather than a complete lack of herding. For 4 countries (ECU, IRE, JAM and 
POR) there is evidence that S&P’s leads both Fitch and Moody’s without any evidence that 
S&P’s follows either of these CRAs indicating that S&P’s is the clear leader for these countries. 
In none of these countries is this conclusion due to missing information because results are 
available for all 3 CRAs in each case.
21
 For 3 countries (ICE, RUS, and TUR) there is evidence 
that Fitch leads both Moody’s and S&P’s without any evidence that Fitch follows either of these 
CRAs. However, in one of these countries (TUR), this conclusion involves missing information 
because the results are not available for Moody’s and S&P’s. Neverthelss, in this case, our 
results still provide strong evidence that Fitch is the clear leader for these 3 countries.
22
 For 1 
country (CYP) there is evidence that Moody’s leads Fitch and S&P’s without any evidence that 
Moody’s follows either of these CRAs suggesting that Moody’s is the clear leader for this 
country.
23
 This way of presenting the evidence confirms the conclusions drawn above that S&P’s 
is the unambiguous leader for more countries than the other CRAs which is consistent with the 
prior belief that this is because this is most established CRA with greatest reputational capital. 
The inference that Fitch exhibits unambiguous more leadership than Moody’s also confirms the 
conclusions from the discussion above however it is not consistent with our prior belief that 
Fitch is likely to have the least reputational capital. This latter conclusion may be due to our 
consideration of only a subset of countries that are rated and that it is not representative of the 
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 In 1 of these countries (POR) there is evidence that Fitch also leads Moody’s suggesting that there is a clear order 
of leadership for Portugal: S&P’s, Fitch, Moody’s. 
22
 For ICE there is also evidence that S&P’s leads Moody’s suggesting the order of leadership for Iceland is Fitch, 
S&P’s and Moody’s; while for RUS the evident order of leadership is Fitch, Moody’s and S&P’s. 
23
 For CYP there is also evidence that S&P’s leads Fitch suggesting the order of leadership for Iceland is Moody’s, 
S&P’s and Fitch. 
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population or it may be that for sovereign ratings over the period considered that Moody’s is the 
primary follower in ratings assignments.
24
  
 
5.3 Split sample individual country regressions 
 
Table 10 reports the results of individual country regressions that allow both slope 
coefficients to change between 2007M05 and 2007M06 – equations (9) and (10). For some 
countries ordered probit models could not be estimated, therefore, results are only reported for 8 
countries for the Fitch and Moody’s CRA pairing, for 12 countries for the Fitch and S&P’s CRA 
pairing and for 9 countries for the Moody’s and S&P’s CRA pairing. Whilst only providing a 
partial picture of any changes in herding behaviour, (we only report results on the herding 
coefficients because this is the focus of our interest), the results provide interesting indicative 
insights into the issues that we wish to consider. The columns headed GNC-pre and GNC-post  
denote the Granger causality (herding) coefficient before and after the break point, respectively, 
with the adjacent columns, denoted P[t(h)], giving the probability value of a t-test for the 
significance of the associated coefficient and P(break) is the probability value of a t-test for the 
significance of the break.
25
  
For 3 countries (LAT, LIT and POR) there is evidence of a significant change  in the 
coefficient on Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 in the equation where Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable – see P(break). In 
all 3 cases the coefficient declines indicating that Fitch’s tendency to follow (herd towards) 
Moody’s rating last period falls after the break for these 3 countries. Nevertheless, Fitch still 
exhibits significant herding after the break for 1 country (LIT). For 1 country (LAT) the 
coefficient on Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡−1  changes significantly in the equation where Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡  is the dependent 
variable such that the coefficient that is insignificant before the break becomes significant after 
                                                          
24
 For the remaining countries unidirectional leadership is indicated as follows (we do not highlight any dual 
leadership). For GRE, NEW, PHI, ROM, THA and VEN S&P’s leads Moody’s while for DOM and SPA S&P’s 
leads Fitch with no other unidirectional leadership indicated. For HOG and URU Fitch leads S&P’s with no other 
unidirectional leadership indicated. For ARG, ITA and LIT Moody’s leads Fitch with no other unidirectional 
leadership indicated. For LAT Fitch leads Moody’s with no other unidirectional leadership indicated. When 
considering these conclusions it should be borne in mind that results were not available for all 3 CRA pairings for 
HOG, ITA, NEW, PHI, SPA and THA. 
25
 The post-break coefficient is calculated as the sum of the pre-break coefficient and the change in the coefficient 
between the two periods while the t-test for the significance of the post-break coefficient is for the null hypothesis 
that the sum of the pre-break coefficient and change coefficient is zero. P(break) is the probability value for the null 
hypothesis that the change coefficient is zero. 
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the break. This increase implies that Moody’s tendency to follow Fitch’s rating last period rises 
after the break indicating evident intentional herding in this country. These results suggest that 
while there is only a significant change in 4 out of 16 instances they all indicate an increase in 
Moody’s tendency to follow Fitch and a decrease in Fitch’s inclination to herd towards Moody’s 
ratings after the break. 
For 3 countries (IRE, LIT and POR) there is evidence of a significant change in the 
coefficient on Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 in the equation where Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable. In all 3 cases the 
coefficient rises indicating that Fitch’s tendency to follow S&P’s rating last period increases 
after the break for these 3 countries and in 2 cases (LIT and SPA) the coefficient changes from 
insignificant before the break to significantly positive after the break, suggesting intentional 
herding. For a further 4 countries (ECU, GRE, POR and RUS) there is evidence that Fitch 
intentionally herds towards S&P’s rating because the coefficient changes from insignificant 
before the break to significantly positive after the break, even though the change in the 
coefficient is not significant. For 1 country (KAZ) the coefficient on Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 changes 
significantly in the equation where Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable such that the coefficient that 
is insignificant before the break becomes significant and positive after the break. This increase 
indicates that S&P’s tendency to follow Fitch’s rating last period rises after the break suggesting 
intentional herding in this country. Conversely, for 3 countries (GRE, POR and RUS) the 
coefficient that is positive and significant prior to the break becomes insignificant after the break 
which, even though the change in coefficient is not significant, is indicative of a reduction in any 
tendency by S&P to herd towards Fitch (any apparent herding is unintentional). It is interesting 
to be reminded that the results in Table 7 indicated dual leadership (Granger-causality) for 
Greece when the models were estimated over the full sample. By splitting the sample our results 
imply that leadership changed for this country from Fitch being the leader prior to the break to 
S&P becoming the leader after the break. This highlights the importance of considering 
heterogeneity of leadership through time as well as across countries.
26
 These results generally 
suggest an increase in Fitch’s inclination to (intentionally) herd towards S&P’s rating after the 
break rather than the other way around. 
                                                          
26
 Our results in Table 10 do not include any other countries for which dual leadership (Granger-causality) is 
indicated in Table 6 – 8. 
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For 4 countries (CYP, IRE, LIT and POR) there is evidence of a significant change in the 
coefficient on Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 in the equation where Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable. In all 4 cases the 
coefficient rises from insignificant before the break to significantly positive after the break 
suggesting Moody’s tendency to intentional herd towards S&P’s previous rating. For a further 2 
countries (ECU and LAT) there is evidence that Moody’s intentionally herds towards S&P’s 
rating because the coefficient changes from insignificant before the break to significantly 
positive after the break, even though the change in the coefficient is not significant.
 27
 For 1 
country (POR) the coefficient on Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 changes significantly in the equation where Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 is 
the dependent variable such that the coefficient that is positive and significant before the break 
becomes insignificant after the break. This reduction implies that S&P’s tendency to follow 
Moody’s previous rating falls after the break indicating that any apparent herding by S&P’s is 
unintentional in this country. Nevertheless, there is 1 country (CYP) where the herding 
coefficient that is insignificant prior to the break becomes positive and significant after the break 
which, even though the change in coefficient is not significant, is indicative of an increase S&P’s 
tendency to intentionally herd towards Moody’s rating. However, in CYP there is bi-directional 
causality where the post break coefficient is greater on Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 than Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 which possibly 
suggests a greater tendency for Moody’s to (intentionally) herd towards S&P’s than the other 
way around.
28
 These results generally indicate an increase in Moody’s inclination to 
(intentionally) herd towards S&P’s rating after the break rather than the other way around. 
Overall, the CRA’s appear to make independent rating assignments for the majority of 
countries as should be expected of autonomous agencies. However, there is evidence of 
intentional herding for some countries and in the vast majority of cases it is Fitch and Moody’s 
that intentionally herd towards S&P’s. This would be consistent with our prior expectation that, 
to the extent that there is intentional herding, it is towards the main agency with the most 
reputational capital (S&P’s). However, we do not find any evidence of Fitch (that might be 
expected to have the least reputational capital) being engaged in notably greater intentional 
herding than Moody’s. 
 
6. Conclusion 
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 Whilst there is no significant change for GRE the herding coefficient increases after the break (it is significant in 
both periods) further confirming Moody’s increasing inclination to follow S&P’s assignments after the break. 
28
 This result may indicate that there is a change leadership in the post-break period. 
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We assess herding by considering the lead-lag relationship of sovereign ratings assigned 
by the 3 main CRAs. The only previous study of the lead-lag relationship for sovereign ratings 
(Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010) used pooled data methods that assume this lead-lag relationship 
is homogeneous across countries. Our pooled estimation results suggest bi-directional Granger-
causality for all three CRA pairings implying that all of the CRAs herd towards each others’ 
ratings with no clear leader or follower.  
Given that different CRAs may have dissimilar levels of expertise and reputational 
capital for different countries it is not obvious that such homogeneity holds. We therefore are the 
first to conduct poolability tests within this context to assess this assumption and find evidence 
of heterogeneity (refuting Hypothesis 1) and thereby extend the literature on herding among 
CRAs' sovereign assignments. This leads us to conduct country-by-country time-series tests to 
assess the lead-lag relationship among agencies and, to our knowledge, we are the first to do this 
for sovereign ratings.  
These results suggest an absence of herding across the CRAs for almost one third of the 
35 countries that we consider. They also indicate that no one CRA is the leader for all countries 
where herding is apparent. Nevertheless, they do suggest that S&P’s is the leader for more 
countries than the other CRAs which is consistent with the prior belief that S&P’s is the most 
established CRA with greatest reputational capital. We also find that Fitch exhibits leadership for 
more countries than Moody’s which is unexpected because Fitch may be regarded as the CRA 
possessing the least reputational capital.  
To assess the extent to which any herding is intentional we also consider changes in the 
lead-lag relationship through time by splitting the sample into pre-crisis and crisis periods. Our 
results indicate that this relationship changes through time for some countries (refuting 
Hypothesis 2 and supporting Hypothesis 3) and when it does it typically changes such that 
S&P’s ratings are followed in the crisis period. Hence, in the vast majority of countries where 
herding is found to be intentional it is Fitch and Moody’s that intentionally herd towards S&P’s. 
This further confirms our expectations given that S&P’s is regarded as possessing the greatest 
reputational capital.  
These findings contribute to an ongoing debate about the regulatory implications for 
CRAs and the openness of the market for new entrants.  Although we cannot confirm the herding 
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behaviour in all cases, it is evident that S&P’s has a dominant position in the market. The 
remaining two agencies then often follow the leading agency. Thus CRAs do not collude 
perfectly. S&P’s differentiates itself from the other two CRAs in terms of ratings quality. 
However, this differentiation in ratings quality is not observable by market participants since 
Moody’s and Fitch Ratings identify themselves with S&P’s. Such a finding raises doubts about 
the independent judgment of CRAs as pointed out by White (2010). 
The presence of herding behaviour among CRAs undermines the exclusive position of 
CRAs as ‘safety’ judgments about credit risk which have the force of law. In addition, greater 
information disclosure about the rating assignments of CRAs would contribute to higher 
objectivity of the rating process. That would bring a certain degree of competition among CRAs 
and motivate them to design more reliable models. Cantor and Packer (1996) show that risks of 
sovereign credit ratings reflect macroeconomic fundamentals. In other words, CRAs could 
distinguish themselves by providing better and more reliable ratings as discussed by Opp, Opp 
and Harris (2013).  
Extension of our research could be directed in several ways. One unanswered question is 
whether all three CRAs use the same quantitative determinants with the same weights for 
sovereign rating assignments. In other words, it would be desirable to assess and compare how 
reliable the models are for predicting sovereign ratings. This could also be done so as to 
distinguish between emerging markets and developed economies. This could help explain the 
reputational effects of CRAs and provide insights into why CRAs herd. A further research 
question closely related to our study is to investigate whether herding behaviour is evident in 
rating assignments of other instruments like Credit Default Swaps or Corporate Bonds. Finally, 
there is also scope for addressing methodological issues such as the consideration of all 3 CRAs 
simultaneously, rather than in pairs, to assess herding. This would require increased time-series 
sample sizes to feasibly implement country-by-country, which may become possible as time 
passes and more data becomes available. 
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Appendix 1 
 
The 35 countries (with their associated country identifier given in parentheses) are: Argentina 
(ARG), Bahrain (BAR), Brazil (BRA), Cyprus (CYP), Czech Republic (CZE), Dominican 
Republic (DOM), Ecuador (ECU), Estonia (EST), Greece (GRE), Hong Kong (HOG), Hungary 
(HUN), Iceland (ICE), Indonesia (INO), Ireland (IRE), Italy (ITA), Jamaica (JAM), Kazakhstan 
(KAZ), South Korea (KOR), Latvia (LAT), Lebanon (LEB), Lithuania (LIT), New Zealand 
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(NEW), Peru (PER), Philippines (PHI), Portugal (POR), Romania (ROM), Russia (RUS), 
Slovakia (SLO), Slovenia (SLV), Spain (SPA), Thailand (THA), Turkey (TUR), Ukraine (UKR), 
Uruguay (URU), Venezuela (VEN). 
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Table 1: Pooled GNC ordered probit regressions 
Dependent variable Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 
GNC  0.382 0.362 0.503 0.451 0.631 0.339 
 
( 4.403)*** ( 4.243)*** ( 6.365)*** ( 3.856)*** ( 7.795)*** ( 3.739)*** 
Habit  0.217 0.052 0.059 0.034 0.044 0.235 
 ( 2.544)** -0.396 -0.349 -0.338 -0.377 ( 2.586)*** 
Pseudo-𝑅2 0.022 0.012 0.036 0.023 0.051 0.016 
p[LR] 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N 24 24 28 28 23 23 
Observations 3911 3908 4715 4715 4638 4641 
𝑆𝑇
𝑆 48.198** 28.797** 38.537** 17.505** 42.834** 27.330** 
Table notes. Each equation (in each column) is estimated using ordered probit regression with all countries pooled together in each model. Dependent variable 
indicates the regressand in the relevant two variable system of equations to which the results refer. GNC denotes the Granger causality (herding) coefficient 
while Habit represents the autoregressive (habit) coefficient. Figures in brackets are t-ratios based on Huber-White robust standard errors. Significance at the 
1% level is indicated with ***, at the 5% level with **, and at the 10% level with *. Pseudo-𝑅2 denotes the pseudo-𝑅2 statistic and p[LR] represents the probability 
value of the LR statstic for the null that all slope coefficients are zero. Observations give the total number of observations used in the estimation of the pooled 
models while N represents the number of countries included in each pooled regression. 𝑆𝑇
𝑆 denotes the maximum value of Chortareas and Kapetanios's (2009) 
poolability test statistic – it is the maximum value of the individual country statistics. The 5% critical values with (k =) 2 slope coefficients are 11.948 (N=20), 
12.328 (N=25) and 12.785 (N=30) - see Table 1 in Kapetanios (2003, p. 14). In our applications with N = 24, N = 28 and N = 23 the approximate 5% critical values 
for S(sup) are: 12.252, 12.602 and 12.176, respectively. Rejection of poolability is indicated by **. 
 
 
  
 34 
 
Table 2: Individual country poolability test statistics (ordered probit regressions) 
 Dependent variable  Dependent variable  Dependent variable 
Country Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 Country Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡  Country Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡  Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡  
ARG 1.182 0.046 ARG 9.441** 0.959 ARG 0.422 1.541 
BAR 23.225** 15.881** BRA 1.993 4.503 BAR 42.834** 21.270** 
BRA 22.035** 16.104** CYP 2.001 15.575** BRA 2.319 16.851** 
CYP 5.921 17.153** CZE 26.474** 10.280** CYP 1.447 4.79 
DOM 6.117** 18.608** DOM 5.499 0.132 DOM 3.265 8.970** 
ECU 8.719** 8.475** ECU 1.237 17.505** ECU 0.263 3.085 
GRE 12.830** 0.494 EST 0.95 1.669 GRE 0.077 3.276 
HUN 48.198** 28.797** GRE 2.118 0.488 ICE 10.035** 11.112** 
ICE 7.921** 3.208 HOG 15.289** 3.819 INO 3.603 7.180** 
INO 2.374 0.12 ICE 3.717 7.861** IRE 6.963** 11.011** 
IRE 36.233** 21.914** INO 5.064 3.04 JAM 7.621** 21.218** 
ITA 7.046** 5.326 IRE 9.504** 0.464 LAT 0.746 0.861 
JAM 27.302** 22.832** JAM 5.872 12.835** LIT 1.247 21.081** 
LAT 7.519** 2.36 KAZ 1.012 1.452 NEW 3.131 20.917** 
LIT 8.046** 17.389** KOR 3.997 2.158 PHI 2.288 23.325** 
POR 1.207 1.099 LAT 3.106 1.782 POR 0.299 3.965 
ROM 6.013** 25.707** LEB 20.025** 13.251** ROM 7.913** 14.827** 
RUS 5.234 3.527 LIT 1.281 1.195 RUS 4.911 5.197 
SLO 23.018** 11.021** PER 15.229** 10.274** SLO 1.584 5.316 
SLV 16.930** 11.091** POR 1.75 3.147 SPA 34.025** 23.275** 
TUR 25.842** 3.069 ROM 0.342 14.713** THA 8.532** 2.319 
UKR 26.953** 15.777** RUS 4.645 3.339 URU 10.680** 27.283** 
URU 18.040** 7.068** SLO 17.535** 2.618 VEN 1.067 27.330** 
VEN 39.322** 14.204** SPA 3.463 14.422** 
   
   
TUR 3.492 2.068 
   
   
UKR 38.537** 13.593** 
   
   
URU 0.001 6.533** 
   
   
VEN 1.234 0.121 
   𝑆𝑇
𝑆 48.198** 28.797** 𝑆𝑇
𝑆 38.537** 17.505** 𝑆𝑇
𝑆 42.834** 27.330** 
Table notes. The poolability test statistics for individual countries are reported in the row adjacent to their country identifier and below the dependent variable indicating the 
regressand in the relevant two variable system of equations to which the results refer. The individual country poolability test statistics have a chi-square distribution with k (=2 in 
this case) degrees of freedom giving a 5% critical value for all of these tests is 5.99. 𝑆𝑇
𝑆 denotes the maximum poolability test statistic (by column) which have 5% critical values 
with (k =)  2 slope coefficients of 11.948 (N=20), 12.328 (N=25) and 12.785 (N=30) - see Table 1 in Kapetanios (2003, p. 14). In our applications with N = 24, N = 28 and N = 23 the 
approximate 5% critical values for S(sup) are: 12.252, 12.602 and 12.176, respectively. Rejection of poolability is indicated by **. 
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Table 3: Individual country time-series ordered probit regressions for Fitch and Moody’s: lag length selection 
           
            SC Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 SC Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 
Country 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 4 lags Obs 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 4 lags Obs 
           
           ARG  0.53631*  0.58403  0.61612  0.67089  171  0.69838*  0.72917  0.76953  0.82635  171 
BAR  0.61508*  0.68566 NA NA  140  0.50112*  0.55415  0.62548  0.69680  138 
BRA  0.59614*  0.64056  0.68673  0.72706  200  0.52037*  0.54488  0.56736  0.61970  200 
CYP  0.47042*  0.55237 NA NA  116  0.58523*  0.61602  0.64732  0.71365  114 
DOM  0.87299*  0.97705  0.98537  1.09593  79  0.78592*  0.82560  0.89203  1.00197  78 
ECU  0.68947*  0.77783  0.86647  0.95469  105  0.90998*  0.99830  1.05972  1.14798  105 
GRE  0.81902*  0.84689  0.89770  0.93620  189  0.70162  0.66667*  0.72066  0.77080  189 
HUN  0.44597*  0.50265  0.55933  0.60525  184  0.72203*  0.77872  0.83540  0.88054  184 
ICE  0.44768* NA NA NA  141  0.58413*  0.60553  0.66121 NA  139 
INO  0.64515* NA NA NA  173  0.69737*  0.72923  0.78862  0.84760  170 
IRE  0.45551*  0.49211  0.53797  0.58041  202  0.54723*  0.58540  0.62965  0.64633  202 
ITA  0.29891*  0.35010 NA NA  206  0.27408*  0.32580 NA NA  206 
JAM  0.84802*  0.98443  1.12083  1.12352  60  0.83714*  0.97186  1.10657 NA  61 
LAT  0.59133*  0.66952  0.73698  0.81562  122  0.53604*  0.59449  0.64696  0.72579  121 
LIT  0.45215*  0.49418  0.55009  0.59491  175  0.51556*  0.57457  0.63357  0.67604  175 
POR  0.45429*  0.49959  0.53860  0.54338  204  0.48344*  0.53330  0.48897 NA  205 
ROM  0.71578*  0.78053  0.81798 NA  153  0.60354*  0.62970  0.69537  0.71938  150 
RUS  0.84075*  0.89348  0.94102  0.99195  177  0.63708*  0.67876  0.72920  0.78721  177 
SLO  0.47559*  0.53277  0.58993  0.61666  180  0.45066*  0.50812  0.56556  0.61019  180 
SLV  0.39000*  0.44656  0.50312 NA  184  0.44660*  0.50303 NA NA  185 
TUR  0.62499*  0.67712  0.72925  0.77500  204  0.24508*  0.29680 NA NA  206 
UKR  0.63845*  0.71985  0.80126  0.86210  117  0.35462*  0.43494 NA NA  119 
URU  0.75347*  0.78548  0.81833  0.86819  199  0.49599*  0.51549  0.55529  0.60188  199 
VEN  0.63891*  0.70020  0.76149  0.80679  167  0.47915*  0.51456  0.56127  0.61479  167 
           
           SC Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡  indicates the SC where Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable while SC Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡  indicates the SC where Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable. All models 
are estimated over the sample period to ensure the reported SC statistics are comparable. An asterisk indicates the minimized SC for each country. Not 
all models could be estimated at all lag lengths (models that could not be estimated are indicated with an entry of NA). Obs represents the sample size. 
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Table 4: Individual country time-series ordered probit regressions for Fitch and S&P’s: lag length selection 
           
            SC Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 SC Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 
Country 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 4 lags Obs 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 4 lags Obs 
           
           ARG  0.54681*  0.60107  0.62482  0.68272  171  0.75220*  0.78088  0.82736  0.88072  171 
BRA  0.58967*  0.64235  0.68319  0.72584  200  0.54333*  0.59562  0.64828  0.70039  200 
CYP  0.47560*  0.50175 NA NA  116  0.55828* NA NA NA  117 
CZE  0.33545*  0.39015  0.44484  0.49953  192  0.33220*  0.38694  0.44169  0.49643  192 
DOM  0.59584*  0.68999  0.78405  0.87749  96  0.80711*  0.84883  0.89715  0.98061  96 
ECU  0.66290*  0.75147  0.74522  0.83378  105  1.05216*  1.14076  1.22305  1.31149  105 
EST  0.57329*  0.63348  0.69563  0.75723  164  0.46763*  0.52697  0.57554 NA  165 
GRE  0.79813*  0.81703  0.85879  0.90476  189  0.77174*  0.82507  0.87327  0.92043  189 
HOG  0.31924*  0.37128  0.42332  0.45910  204  0.41481*  0.46664  0.51847  0.57029  204 
ICE  0.45944* NA NA NA  141  0.51406*  0.57616 NA NA  140 
INO  0.62273*  0.68144  0.73315  0.78832  170  1.22717*  1.25612  1.31064  1.36729  170 
IRE  0.39194*  0.42660  0.47341  0.52391  202  0.57165*  0.58591  0.60552  0.63559  202 
JAM  0.73201*  0.86721  0.91571  1.02790  60  0.83771*  0.97411  0.97036  1.02579  60 
KAZ  0.52840*  0.58702  0.64563  0.66262  176  0.56652*  0.62462  0.68316  0.74169  176 
KOR  0.77410*  0.80169  0.83129  0.88445  182  0.96934*  1.00507  1.01624  1.07343  182 
LAT  0.53285*  0.58292  0.59471  0.65738  158  0.62765*  0.67834  0.72817  0.75190  158 
LEB  0.41491*  0.47416  0.50574  0.56497  174  0.46246*  0.52172  0.58099  0.64026  174 
LIT  0.54771*  0.58721  0.64679  0.70248  170  0.50674*  0.55075  0.59351  0.65269  170 
PER  0.47935*  0.54890  0.59854  0.66825  142  0.47935*  0.54890  0.54509  0.61483  142 
POR  0.46042*  0.50578  0.54429  0.58921  204  0.43895*  0.48870  0.52798  0.56198  204 
ROM  0.74054  0.70387*  0.72827  0.77850  172  0.64904*  0.70887  0.76871  0.82352  172 
RUS  0.83838*  0.88495  0.93766  0.99143  178  0.86705*  0.89139  0.94256  0.96443  178 
SLO  0.47116*  0.52758 NA NA  182  0.46539*  0.48107  0.51858  0.54824  180 
SPA  0.34437*  0.39648  0.44861  0.50075  204  0.36748*  0.41962  0.47175  0.52389  204 
TUR  0.59518*  0.63955  0.69034  0.71128  204  0.47050*  0.50365  0.54760  0.59062  204 
UKR  0.64274*  0.70942  0.79138  0.79116  116  0.83098*  0.90146  0.98342  1.01894  116 
URU  0.73615*  0.77670  0.77309  0.82106  199  0.79612*  0.81128  0.82348  0.84684  199 
VEN  0.62727*  0.68855  0.74094  0.79133  167  0.77391*  0.79104  0.82443  0.82659  167 
           
           SC Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡  indicates the SC where Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable while SC Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡  indicates the SC where Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable. All models 
are estimated over the sample period to ensure the reported SC statistics are comparable. An asterisk indicates the minimized SC for each country. Not 
all models could be estimated at all lag lengths (models that could not be estimated are indicated with an entry of NA). Obs represents the sample size. 
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Table 5: Individual country time-series ordered probit regressions for Moody’s and S&P’s: lag length selection 
           
            SC Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 SC Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 
Country 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 4 lags Obs 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 4 lags Obs 
           
           ARG  0.56782*  0.60118  0.63433  0.68366  216  0.62817*  0.66530  0.70784  0.75183  216 
BAR  0.52769*  0.61373  0.66313  0.74892  109  0.51622* NA NA NA  112 
BRA  0.50931*  0.56181  0.60581  0.65803  201  0.55038*  0.60273  0.64856  0.66881  201 
CYP  0.41970*  0.48085  0.51789 NA  164  0.49317*  0.55227  0.53751  0.56816  163 
DOM  0.67460*  0.74217  0.81238  0.89682  105  0.89819*  0.94108  1.02848  1.07199  106 
ECU  0.72561*  0.79811  0.84186  0.88331  133  0.92543*  0.99860  1.07213  1.14565  133 
GRE  0.63474*  0.64058  0.67534  0.72252  207  0.74927*  0.78954  0.82425  0.84524  207 
ICE  0.47402*  0.51115  0.53809  0.58522  224  0.41182*  0.45824  0.50654  0.54981  224 
INO  0.57715*  0.61840  0.66695  0.71584  209  1.10683*  1.11525  1.16305  1.21110  209 
IRE  0.42951*  0.45268  0.48009  0.50403  261  0.46913*  0.48974  0.48560  0.50159  261 
JAM  0.43236*  0.50167  0.52275  0.57915  141  0.60123*  0.65421  0.65212  0.71510  141 
LAT  0.54053  0.54215  0.53629*  0.61533  121  0.70925*  0.78730  0.85190  0.90699  122 
LIT  0.50972*  0.57011  0.63013  0.68872  170  0.52041*  0.57320  0.59489  0.65505  170 
NEW  0.24892*  0.28694  0.32422  0.36221  300  0.23616*  0.26058  0.29841  0.33643  300 
PHI  0.40156*  0.45110  0.48048  0.52994  217  0.34948*  0.39907  0.44865  0.49823  217 
POR  0.44783*  0.49588  0.53011  0.55498  224  0.45172*  0.49968  0.54798  0.59619  224 
ROM  0.61449*  0.66895 NA NA  154  0.60568*  0.64572  0.71028  0.76287  151 
RUS  0.68779*  0.72678  0.77691  0.83430  177  0.87363*  0.92397  0.94004  0.98820  177 
SLO  0.39682*  0.44887  0.50295  0.55687  195  0.53823*  0.58843  0.64236  0.69574  195 
SPA  0.28345*  0.32417  0.36490  0.40563  276  0.28706*  0.32779  0.36852  0.40925  276 
THA  0.28631*  0.31416  0.32689  0.36707  264  0.35030*  0.38382  0.41370  0.45556  264 
URU  0.47195*  0.50581  0.51274  0.56188  210  0.79877*  0.83630  0.87651  0.91617  210 
VEN  0.34405*  0.36820  0.40531  0.44054  290  0.73986*  0.75546  0.78384  0.79913  290 
           
           SC Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡  indicates the SC where Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable while SC Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡  indicates the SC where Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable. All models 
are estimated over the sample period to ensure the reported SC statistics are comparable. An asterisk indicates the minimized SC for each country. Not 
all models could be estimated at all lag lengths (models that could not be estimated are indicated with an entry of NA). Obs represents the sample size. 
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Table 6: Individual country time-series ordered probit regressions for Fitch and Moody’s 
           
            Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 Observations 
Country GNC P[t] Habit P[t] GNC P[t] Habit P[t] Dep Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 Dep Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 
           
           ARG  0.563***  0.010  0.292**  0.012  0.353*  0.079  0.110  0.642  174  174 
BAR -0.035  0.664 -0.007  0.803 -0.019  0.773 -0.090  0.382  141  141 
BRA -0.107  0.244 -0.086  0.283 -0.104  0.259 -0.130  0.217  203  203 
CYP  0.787**  0.018 -0.077  0.400 -0.023  0.662 -0.023  0.668  117  117 
DOM  0.811  0.109 -0.059  0.412 -0.004  0.960 -0.017  0.988  82  81 
ECU  0.642  0.133 -0.404  0.184 -0.380  0.186  0.613  0.141  108  108 
GRE  0.417*  0.077 -0.178  0.146  0.310  0.257  0.243  0.317  192  192 
HUN  0.000  0.716 -0.000  0.968  0.000  0.636  0.000  0.721  187  187 
ICE -0.570*  0.084  1.136***  0.010  0.943**  0.022 -0.385*  0.077  141  141 
INO  0.427  0.427  0.369  0.588  0.169  0.789  0.245  0.652  173  173 
IRE -0.032  0.521 -0.068  0.395 -0.048  0.430 -0.022  0.543  205  205 
ITA  1.122**  0.035 -1.368**  0.022  0.067  0.612 -0.007  0.842  207  207 
JAM -0.088  0.613  0.029  0.729  0.029  0.729 -0.088  0.613  63  63 
LAT -0.241  0.254  1.145*  0.074  1.190**  0.040 -0.254  0.213  128  127 
LIT  2.003***  0.001 -0.388  0.197 -0.030  0.625 -0.037  0.465  178  178 
POR  0.577*  0.072  0.501  0.190  0.433*  0.082  0.259  0.129  207  207 
ROM  0.523*  0.098 -0.044  0.499  0.033  0.558 -0.730***  0.007  157  156 
RUS  0.342  0.302  0.527***  0.000  0.830***  0.001 -0.112  0.515  180  180 
SLO -0.089  0.281 -0.210  0.172 -0.160  0.262 -0.066  0.353  183  183 
SLV -0.074  0.391 -0.123  0.340 -0.038  0.670 -0.023  0.676  186  186 
TUR -0.029  0.660 -0.022  0.573  1.078***  0.008 -0.010  0.899  207  207 
UKR -0.021  0.718 -0.009  0.788 -0.019  0.749 -0.044  0.601  120  120 
URU -0.131  0.226  0.339*  0.072  0.064  0.569  0.625**  0.048  202  202 
VEN -0.018  0.720  0.004  0.852  0.018  0.821 -0.079  0.390  170  170 
           
           GNC denotes the Granger causality (herding) coefficient and Habit represents the autoregressive (habit) coefficient. P[t] gives the probability value of a t-test for 
the significance of the corresponding coefficient based upon Huber White (QML) robust coefficient standard errors. Dep Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡  indicates that Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡  is the 
dependent variable where, 𝑋 = F, M or S. Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡 indicates a statistic referring to the coefficient on Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 in the equation where Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the dependent 
variable, where, 𝑌 = F, M or S. Similarly, Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡 indicates a statistic referring to the coefficient on Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 in the equation where Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the dependent 
variable. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis that a statistic is zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Observations give the number of 
time-series observations used to estimate a model. There are results for (N =) 24 countries and the total number of observations (summing across all 24 
countries) is 3911 with Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 as the dependent variable and 3908 with Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 as the dependent variable. 
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Table 7: Individual country time-series ordered probit regressions for Fitch and S&P’s 
           
            Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 Observations 
Country GNC P[t] Habit P[t] GNC P[t] Habit P[t] Dep Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 Dep Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 
           
           ARG  0.023  0.874  0.463**  0.013  0.543*  0.051  0.219  0.244  174  174 
BRA  0.663  0.196 -0.273  0.142  0.761  0.179 -0.416**  0.045  203  203 
CYP  1.312**  0.031 -0.015  0.834 -0.081  0.245 -0.167  0.295  117  117 
CZE -0.081  0.356 -0.100  0.445 -0.100  0.445 -0.081  0.356  195  195 
DOM  1.057***  0.000 -0.002  0.895  0.480*  0.064 -0.000  1.000  99  99 
ECU  0.597**  0.034 -0.148*  0.056 -0.101  0.131  0.425**  0.036  108  108 
EST  0.910  0.113 -0.063  0.413  0.893*  0.092 -0.117  0.302  167  167 
GRE  0.718***  0.005 -0.262*  0.095  0.629**  0.035  0.086  0.701  192  192 
HOG -0.144  0.344 -0.100  0.445  1.403**  0.042 -0.226  0.149  207  207 
ICE -0.592  0.373  1.105**  0.045  1.215***  0.001 -0.099  0.817  141  141 
INO  0.485***  0.001  0.616***  0.001  1.011***  0.001 -0.082  0.653  173  173 
IRE  1.616***  0.000 -0.068  0.428  0.503  0.169 -0.041  0.461  205  205 
JAM  1.519***  0.001 -0.355*  0.061 -0.029  0.659 -0.021  0.838  63  63 
KAZ  0.819  0.138 -0.101  0.318  0.756  0.164 -0.119  0.264  179  179 
KOR  0.185  0.197 -0.125  0.715  0.011  0.968  0.075  0.667  185  185 
LAT  0.515  0.121  0.722*  0.084  0.648  0.111  0.453  0.145  161  161 
LEB -0.043  0.646 -0.076  0.428 -0.051  0.489 -0.029  0.664  177  177 
LIT  1.009*  0.096 -0.168  0.238  0.957*  0.091 -0.160  0.331  173  173 
PER -0.161  0.294 -0.161  0.294 -0.161  0.294 -0.161  0.294  145  145 
POR  0.860**  0.037  0.354  0.304  0.232  0.334  0.564**  0.048  207  207 
ROM  0.625  0.169 -0.030  0.558 -0.023  0.585 -0.024  0.637  175  175 
RUS  0.180  0.430  0.525***  0.000  0.774***  0.000  0.158  0.259  181  181 
SLO -0.249  0.128 -0.249  0.128  0.895  0.134 -0.225  0.155  183  183 
SPA  1.537**  0.012 -0.445*  0.078 -0.008  0.817 -0.012  0.787  207  207 
TUR  1.315***  0.005 -0.216  0.124  0.443  0.284  0.893  0.143  207  207 
UKR -0.004  0.873 -0.007  0.814 -0.013  0.782 -0.007  0.865  119  119 
URU  0.516  0.217  0.047  0.911  0.793***  0.001 -0.543***  0.008  202  202 
VEN  0.306*  0.063 -0.005  0.822  0.472  0.187  0.000  1.000  170  170 
           
           GNC denotes the Granger causality (herding) coefficient and Habit represents the autoregressive (habit) coefficient. P[t] gives the probability value of a t-test for 
the significance of the corresponding coefficient based upon Huber White (QML) robust coefficient standard errors. Dep Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡  indicates that Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡  is the 
dependent variable where, 𝑋 = F, M or S. Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡 indicates a statistic referring to the coefficient on Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 in the equation where Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the dependent 
variable, where, 𝑌 = F, M or S. Similarly, Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡 indicates a statistic referring to the coefficient on Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 in the equation where Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the dependent 
variable. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis that a statistic is zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Observations give the number of 
time-series observations used to estimate a model. There are results for (N =) 28 countries and the total number of observations (summing across all 28 
countries) is 4715 with both Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 and Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 as the dependent variable. 
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Table 8: Individual country time-series ordered probit regressions for Moody’s and S&P’s 
           
            Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 Observations 
Country GNC P[t] Habit P[t] GNC P[t] Habit P[t] Dep Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 Dep Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 
           
           ARG  0.509**  0.012  0.156  0.599  0.800**  0.034  0.246  0.291  219  219 
BAR  0.045  0.601 -0.058  0.582  0.058  0.582 -0.045  0.601  112  112 
BRA  0.764  0.186 -0.239  0.104 -0.141  0.195 -0.158  0.155  204  204 
CYP  1.203*  0.056 -0.202  0.260  0.767**  0.042 -0.540  0.115  166  166 
DOM  0.265  0.175 -0.082  0.911 -0.326  0.612  0.012  0.738  108  109 
ECU  0.609**  0.032  0.160  0.412  0.075  0.572  0.410**  0.035  136  136 
GRE  0.636***  0.009 -0.004  0.979 -0.041  0.849  0.425  0.204  210  210 
ICE  1.979***  0.000 -0.488**  0.020 -0.077  0.756  1.468***  0.002  227  227 
INO  0.338**  0.030  0.310  0.239  0.951***  0.000 -0.009  0.970  212  212 
IRE  1.569***  0.000 -0.176  0.147  0.230  0.255 -0.104  0.247  264  264 
JAM  1.614***  0.000 -0.859***  0.009 -0.064  0.476  0.005  0.916  144  144 
LAT  0.948*  0.075 -0.096  0.461  0.381  0.259  0.715  0.181  127  128 
LIT  1.137*  0.065 -0.047  0.388 -0.017  0.712 -0.009  0.788  173  173 
NEW  1.595***  0.005 -0.078  0.422  0.032  0.664 -0.015  0.749  303  303 
PHI  1.622**  0.021 -0.294  0.272 -0.007  0.824 -0.014  0.761  220  220 
POR  0.638**  0.011  0.135  0.261  0.124  0.307  0.625**  0.016  227  227 
ROM  0.960***  0.004 -0.771***  0.004 -0.607*  0.066 -0.000  1.000  156  157 
RUS  0.301  0.167  0.315  0.231  0.970***  0.000  0.342*  0.082  180  180 
SLO  1.068**  0.017 -0.068  0.414  0.689***  0.000  0.714**  0.029  198  198 
SPA -0.025  0.782 -0.033  0.647 -0.013  0.736 -0.010  0.811  279  279 
THA  2.150***  0.004  1.279**  0.027  0.650  0.315  0.875  0.199  267  267 
URU  0.248  0.125  0.539**  0.041  0.001  0.961 -0.002  0.872  213  213 
VEN  0.520***  0.008 -0.064  0.410 -0.007  0.732 -0.001  0.838  293  293 
           
           GNC denotes the Granger causality (herding) coefficient and Habit represents the autoregressive (habit) coefficient. P[t] gives the probability value of a t-test for 
the significance of the corresponding coefficient based upon Huber White (QML) robust coefficient standard errors. Dep Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡  indicates that Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡  is the 
dependent variable where, 𝑋 = F, M or S. Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡 indicates a statistic referring to the coefficient on Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 in the equation where Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the dependent 
variable, where, 𝑌 = F, M or S. Similarly, Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡 indicates a statistic referring to the coefficient on Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 in the equation where Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the dependent 
variable. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis that a statistic is zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Observations give the number of 
time-series observations used to estimate a model. There are results for (N =) 23 countries and the total number of observations (summing across all 23 
countries) is 4638 with Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 as the dependent variable and 4641 with Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 as the dependent variable. 
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Table 9: Summary of CRA leadership based on ordered probit results 
CRA pairing→ Fitch and Moody’s Fitch and S&P’s Moody’s and S&P’s 
CRA leader→ 
Fitch Moody’s Dual Fitch S&P’s Dual Moody’s S&P’s Dual 
Country ↓ 
ARG  L       L, M 
BAR    - - -    
BRA          
CYP  L   L  L   
CZE - - -    - - - 
DOM     L     
ECU     L, HS   L, HS  
EST - - -    - - - 
GRE      L, S  L  
HOG - - - L   - - - 
HUN    - - - - - - 
ICE L, HF   L, HF    L, HS, CM  
INO      L, F, HF   L, M 
IRE     L   L  
ITA  L, CF  - - - - - - 
JAM     L   L, CM  
KAZ - - -    - - - 
KOR - - -    - - - 
LAT L         
LEB - - -    - - - 
LIT  L        
NEW - - -     L  
PER - - -    - - - 
PHI - - -     L  
POR L    L, HS   L, HS  
ROM        L, CM  
RUS L, HF   L, HF   L   
SLO         L, S, HS 
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Table 9 (continued): Summary of CRA leadership based on ordered probit results 
CRA pairing→ Fitch and Moody’s Fitch and S&P’s Moody’s and S&P’s 
CRA leader→ 
Fitch Moody’s Dual Fitch S&P’s Dual Moody’s S&P’s Dual 
Country ↓ 
SLV    - - - - - - 
SPA - - -  L     
THA - - -     L, HM  
TUR L    L  - - - 
UKR       - - - 
URU    L, CS      
VEN        L  
The pair of CRAs results under consideration is specified in the row labeled “CRA pairing”. If an CRA unambiguously leads the other for any 
pairing for a particular country this is indicated with the letter “L” in that CRA’s column. If there is bi-directional Granger-causality (dual 
leadership) this is indicated with an “L” in the column headed “Dual”. The CRA with the largest GNC coefficient when there is bi-directional 
Granger-causality is indicated with the symbol “F” (Fitch), “M” (Moody’s) or “S” S&P’s in the “Dual” column. The absence of leadership is 
indicated by a blank entry while “-” indicates that tests could not be conducted for a particular CRA pairing in a specific country. When an CRA’s 
leadership is confirmed by it exhibiting positive habit behaviour this is indicated by “H*”, where * denotes F for Fitch, M for Moody’s and S for 
S&P’s. Leadership that is reinforced by contrarian habit behaviour is denoted with “C*”.  
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Table 10: Time-series GNC Tests with structural change in 2007 M06 (ordered probit regression) 
             
Country GNC-pre P[t(h)] GNC-post P[t(h)] P(break) Obs GNC-pre P[t(h)] GNC-post P[t(h)] P(break) Obs 
             
 Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 
BAR -0.031  0.667 -0.061  0.679  0.710  141 -0.052  0.534  0.008  0.922  0.632  141 
ECU  0.139  0.532  0.695  0.126  0.155  108  0.028  0.791 -0.490  0.173  0.159  108 
GRE  0.100  0.173  0.467*  0.073  0.075*  192  0.313*  0.087  0.310  0.293  0.990  192 
IRE  0.045  0.781 -0.047  0.396  0.605  205 -0.110  0.485 -0.034  0.540  0.580  205 
LAT  0.080  0.201 -0.874*  0.052  0.047**  128  0.386  0.190  1.449**  0.016  0.019**  127 
LIT  2.277***  0.000  0.986**  0.045  0.021**  178 -0.046  0.538  0.018  0.854  0.631  178 
POR  2.727***  0.000  0.399*  0.093  0.002***  207  0.425*  0.090  0.433*  0.089  0.968  207 
UKR -0.016  0.729 -0.047  0.734  0.749  120 -0.044  0.648 -0.000  0.998  0.709  120 
 Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 
ECU  0.267  0.166  0.606**  0.036  0.143  108  0.059  0.577 -0.128  0.136  0.178  108 
EST  0.479  0.207  0.987  0.125  0.214  167  0.253  0.412  1.021  0.100  0.098*  167 
GRE  0.604*  0.083  0.758***  0.009  0.694  192  1.054**  0.024  0.545*  0.052  0.289  192 
IRE  0.551**  0.047  1.781***  0.000  0.001***  205  0.230  0.432  0.510  0.168  0.131  205 
KAZ  0.921  0.119  0.325  0.308  0.129  179  0.265  0.309  1.571**  0.034  0.032**  179 
LAT  0.614  0.197  0.589  0.121  0.951  161  0.549  0.227  0.625  0.126  0.840  161 
LIT  0.414  0.165  1.724**  0.032  0.041**  173  1.114*  0.075  0.360  0.179  0.101  173 
POR  0.310  0.333  0.930**  0.050  0.184  207  0.611**  0.014  0.190  0.463  0.180  207 
RUS  0.175  0.455  0.344**  0.011  0.414  181  0.783***  0.000  0.460*  0.058  0.233  181 
SPA  0.536*  0.092  2.015***  0.003  0.006***  207 -0.012  0.831 -0.005  0.885  0.908  207 
UKR  0.011  0.810 -0.010  0.782  0.758  119 -0.025  0.687  0.004  0.952  0.730  119 
VEN  0.307*  0.064  0.147  0.374  0.343  170  0.486  0.184  0.239  0.330  0.326  170 
 Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 Δ𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 
BAR  0.061  0.716  0.042  0.601  0.885  112  0.060  0.575  0.048  0.764  0.933  112 
CYP -0.031  0.872  1.463**  0.035  0.034**  166  0.498  0.169  0.773**  0.044  0.479  166 
DOM  0.277  0.163  0.074  0.937  0.830  108 -0.399  0.595 -0.141  0.557  0.629  109 
ECU  0.215  0.262  0.637**  0.036  0.188  136  0.314*  0.079  0.049  0.721  0.154  136 
GRE  0.302**  0.032  0.738**  0.010  0.077*  210  0.179  0.121 -0.114  0.684  0.354  210 
IRE  0.730**  0.021  1.691***  0.000  0.005***  264  0.047  0.578  0.236  0.254  0.222  264 
LAT  0.489  0.184  1.118**  0.048  0.092*  127  0.174  0.336  0.605  0.308  0.453  128 
LIT  0.539  0.151  1.694**  0.026  0.039**  173 -0.015  0.712 -0.031  0.735  0.776  173 
POR  0.283  0.130  0.756***  0.005  0.030**  227  0.479**  0.020  0.032  0.725  0.029**  227 
SPA -0.041  0.723 -0.003  0.975  0.762  279 -0.008  0.851 -0.019  0.701  0.833  279 
GNC-pre and GNC-post denote the Granger causality (herding) coefficient before and after the break point, respectively. P[t(h)] gives the probability value of a t-test for the significance of the 
adjacent coefficient and P(break) is the probability value of a t-test for the significance of a break between 2007M05 and 2007M06; both p-values are based upon Huber White (QML) 
robust coefficient standard errors. Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 to Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡 indicates a statistic referring to the coefficient on Δ𝑅𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 in the equation where Δ𝑅𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable, where 𝑋 = F, M or S and 𝑌 = 
F, M or S. Obs represents the number of observations used in estimation. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Omitted results for countries are 
due to an inability to obtain (satisfactory) estimates.  
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